En este artículo quiero explorar la idea de que la filosofía experimentaldesarrollada en la década de 1660, en Inglaterra, fue una propuesta quetenía dos objetivos principales: i) consolidar una nueva forma de investigarla naturaleza que permitiera comprender su diversidad y complejidad, dondeel empleo del experimento y el rechazo de hipótesis especulativas eran lasprincipales estrategias a desarrollar, implementar y defender; ii) Exigía unanueva actitud por parte de los filósofos naturales de la época sustentadaen la experticia y en la prudencia en elaborar (...) sistemas explicativos, lacual, en muchos casos, entraba en conflicto con los propios intereses de losinvestigadores. Esta tensión permite identificar unas diferencias interesantesentre la filosofía natural de carácter especulativo del siglo XVII y la nacientefilosofía experimental, diferencias que no siempre son señaladas por losestudiosos interesados en la filosofía moderna temprana. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar el conflicto de carácter epistémico y metodológico que está en juego en la discusión Boyle/Spinoza, y que permite apreciar cómo, en la naciente ciencia natural del siglo XVII, habría que revaluar al menos dos aspectos: i) la preferencia por un conocimiento hi..

A hemi-implicative lattice is an algebra \((A,\wedge,\vee,\rightarrow,1)\) of type (2, 2, 2, 0) such that \((A,\wedge,\vee,1)\) is a lattice with top and for every \(a,b\in A\), \(a\rightarrow a = 1\) and \(a\wedge (a\rightarrow b) \le b\). A new variety of hemi-implicative lattices, here named sub-Hilbert lattices, containing both the variety generated by the \(\{\wedge,\vee,\rightarrow,1\}\) -reducts of subresiduated lattices and that of Hilbert lattices as proper subvarieties is defined. It is shown that any sub-Hilbert lattice is determined (up to isomorphism) by (...) a triple (_L_, _D_, _S_) which satisfies the following conditions: _L_ is a bounded distributive lattice, _D_ is a sublattice of _L_ containing 0, 1 such that for each \(a, b \in L\) there is an element \(c \in D\) with the property that for all \(d \in D\), \(a \wedge d \le b\) if and only if \(d \le c\) (we write \(a \rightarrow _D b\) for the element _c_), and _S_ is a non void subset of _L_ such that _S_ is closed under \(\rightarrow _D\) and _S_, with its inherited order, is itself a lattice. Finally, the congruences of sub-Hilbert lattices are studied. (shrink)

The idea that thoughts are structured is essential to Frege's understanding of thoughts. A basic tenet of his thinking was that the structure of a sentence can serve as a model for the structure of a thought. Recent commentators have, however, identified tensions between that principle and certain other doctrines Frege held about thoughts. This paper suggests that the tensions identified by Dummett and Bell are not really tensions at all. In establishing the case against Dummett and Bell the paper (...) argues (a) that Frege was committed, in virtue of his doctrine of decomposition, to the thesis that a single sentence can express a range of thoughts, and (b) that Frege was committed, in virtue of his views about truth, to the thesis that a single thought can be expressed by structurally different sentences. But neither of these theses comes into conflict with the basic principle. (shrink)

In Thinking about Consciousness David Papineau develops a position that combines the following four theses: A) Phenomenal properties exist. B) Any phenomenal property is identical to some material property. C) Phenomenal concepts refer to material properties that are identical to phenomenal properties. D) Phenomenal concepts are vague. The overall position is intended to do justice to materialism (in virtue of (B) and (C)), while at the same time accommodating the concerns both of those impressed by the Knowledge Argument and related (...) arguments (in virtue of (A)) and of those skeptical about the prospects for a science of consciousness (in virtue of D)). This paper shows that (A) through (D) cannot be held simultaneously. (shrink)

Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of 'I'-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize 'I'-thoughts, even though an important class of 'I'-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of 'I' as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. 'I'-thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The (...) dependence here has to do with how a thinker understands what would defeat such thoughts. (shrink)

La primera etapa de este trabajo, parte de la idea del Canon Occidental de Harold Bloom, pero trasladándola al ámbito de la explicación de la conformación y desarrollo de lo que podríamos denominar el Canon liberal, y sostiene que ese canon se cierra con On Liberty; pero, como un pensamiento canónico constituye siempre una realidad dinámica, compleja y en tensión interna permanente, las lecturas e interpretaciones de On Liberty, sobre todo las realizadas en nuestro país desde coordenadas que interpretan a (...) Mill en un sentido no-liberal, iliberal o anti-liberal (como la reciente de Carlos Rodríguez Braun), en realidad, constituyen ejemplos de una lucha interna dentro de ese canon por “abrirlo” y por superar el enorme influjo (“angustia de las influencias” en la terminología de Bloom) que dicha obra ha tenido en el pensamiento occidental. Un ejemplo de la tensión interna dentro del propio canon liberal entre el utilitarismo (y su defensa del valor del individuo y de su bienestar, que es dinámico y en construcción, como elemento crucial de un estado libre, y justo) y el liberalismo (y su defensa del valor primario de la libertad interpretada esencialmente como no intervención y poder limitado) la encontramos en la discusión llevada a cabo por Mill en el capítulo V de Sobre al Libertad acerca de la educación obligatoria. En la segunda parte de este trabajo se exponen y comentan con una cierta amplitud las tesis de Mill sobre este asunto, debido a su relevancia para la interpretación del sentido estricto del liberalismo de Mill. Creemos que es posible articular ambas tendencias sin obligar a Mill a dejar de ser liberal por el hecho de admitir posibles limitaciones a la libertad en circunstancias específicas. Es así por tanto posible sostener que hay buenas razones liberales de raíz utilitarista para sostener dos tesis distintas: (a) que es necesario garantizar una educación universal y obligatoria hasta un cierto nivel, y (b) que caso de noestar adecuadamente garantizada esta educación universal y obligatoria, es aceptable y estaría justificado que el propio Estado no sólo estimulara dicha educación sino que directamente la proporcionara, llegando al extremo de establecer cuáles son los contenidos de esta educación y asegurar su impartición. Finalmente, en la última parte del trabajo, se defiende que no hay contradicción entre esta defensa de una educación obligatoria y universal asumida por el estado y la paralela crítica de Mill al papel de la asunción permanente por parte del Estado de la tarea de educar a los ciudadanos.Para concluir, se defiende el papel central de Mill y de On Liberty en el canon liberal, que debe ser interpretado en un sentido plural, diverso, dinámico y vivo, no necesariamente encerrado o enclaustrado exclusivamente en la tesis, por otra parte central al liberalismo (pero no única) del poder limitado y del rechazo del intervencionismo. Sólo haciendo del liberalismo algo diverso y plural podrán los actuales liberales superar la influencia de Mill y pensar de un modo post-milliano en sentido genuino. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for a naturalistic solution to some of the methodological controversies in regulatory science, on the basis of two case studies: toxicology and health claim regulation. We analyze the debates related to the scientific evidence that is considered necessary for regulatory decision making in each of those two fields, with a particular attention to the interactions between scientific and regulatory aspects. This analysis allows us to identify two general stances in the debate: a) one that argues (...) for more permissive standards of evidence and for methodological pluralism, and b) an opposing one that not only defends strict evidence requirements but also stipulates the use of one particular scientific methodologies for data generation. We argue that the real-world outcomes produced by alternative regulatory options are a vital piece of information that allows for the empirical assessment of these two stances. In particular, this information on outcomes makes it possible to analyze which standards of evidence and scientific methods generate the most useful knowledge as input for regulatory decision making. Our conclusion is that instead of an a priori selection of methodologies and standards, such decisions ought to be based on empirical evidence related to real-world outcomes. (shrink)

Se analizan ciertos conceptos del estructuralismo empirista de Bas van Fraassen, en particular, el de representación, para intentar una crítica a su posición con respecto al vínculo entre los modelos de las teorías y, en última instancia, el mundo físico por medio de los modelos de datos, a los cuales van Fraassen les adjudica el papel de representantes de los fenómenos. Al final se delinea, a muy grandes rasgos, una alternativa conceptualista. The article analyzes certain concepts of the empiricist structuralism (...) of Bas van Fraassen, particularly that of representation, in order to carry out a critique of his position with respect to the link between the models of the theories and, ultimately, the physical world, through data models to which van Fraassen grants the role of representatives of phenomena. Finally, the article outlines a conceptualist alternative. (shrink)

En este escrito se analizan ciertos conceptos del estructuralismo empirista de Bas van Fraassen, en particular, el de representación, para intentar una crítica a su posición con respecto al vínculo entre los modelos de las teorías y, en última instancia, el mundo físico por medio de los modelos de datos, a los cuales van Fraassen les adjudica el papel de representantes de los fenómenos. Al final se delinea, a muy grandes rasgos, una alternativa conceptualista.

Esta obra se concentra en cuatro temas cruciales de la formación de docentes, tanto antes como durante el servicio y en la enseñanza en diferentes áreas y niveles educativos. En primer lugar, se aborda el asunto de las creencias que los docentes tienen sobre el proceso educativo, las cuales parecen influir en la práctica profesional que estos desarrollan y, por lo tanto, deberían recibir la atención explícita de los procesos de formación de docentes que deseen promover prácticas específicas. El segundo (...) tema de la obra es la relación entre la formación de docentes y la política pública que la rige. En particular, se analizan las reformas curriculares implementadas por varias licenciaturas en universidades privadas colombianas, en respuesta a reformas a la normatividad sobre las condiciones de calidad que a las que deben ajustarse todas las licenciaturas del país. El tercer tema analizado es en qué medida los docentes en educación superior van más allá del dominio de su saber disciplinar atribuyendo importancia a la pedagogía, la didáctica y la práctica reflexiva en su propia práctica docente. Finalmente, se discuten aspectos de la formación de docentes relacionados con los procesos vividos y los retos encontrados por los docentes al entrar en la profesión, su socialización en la comunidad docente, sus identidades como maestros y su motivación para ser docentes. Vale la pena señalar que las contribuciones a este libro comparten el uso de metodologías cualitativas y presentan los resultados de historias de vida, entrevistas, observaciones, y análisis documentales, entre otros. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente papel de trabajo es el de examinar los problemas derivados de la diferenciación entre matemáticas y dialéctica en República VI-VII. Se trata de una lectura problemática de los pasajes donde se expone el método dialéctico en este diálogo, a saber, el símil de la línea (509c-511e). Todo ello lo pretendemos abordar a la luz de las implicaciones a) epistemológicas, b) ontológicas y c) metodológicas. Mostraremos las dificultades que se derivan de las tres perspectivas propuestas, en torno (...) a la relación de identidad o diferencia entre matemática y dialéctica. Palabras clave: Platón; República; Matemáticas; Dialéctica; UnidadThe aim of this paper is to examine the problems derived from differentiating between Mathematics and Dialectics in Republic VI-VII. We undertake a problematic reading of the passages where dialectic method is expounded in this dialogue, namely, the simile of the line (509c-511e). We intend to approach all of this in the light of implications of these sorts: a) epistemological, b) ontological, and c) methodological. We will show the difficulties, derived from the three perspectives proposed, regarding the relation of identity or difference between Mathematics and Dialectics. Keywords: Plato; Republic; Mathematics; Dialectics; Unity. (shrink)

An l-hemi-implicative semilattice is an algebra $$\mathbf {A} = $$ A= such that $$$$ is a semilattice with a greatest element 1 and satisfies: for every $$a,b,c\in A$$ a,b,c∈A, $$a\le b\rightarrow c$$ a≤b→c implies $$a\wedge b \le c$$ a∧b≤c and $$a\rightarrow a = 1$$ a→a=1. An l-hemi-implicative semilattice is commutative if if it satisfies that $$a\rightarrow b = b\rightarrow a$$ a→b=b→a for every $$a,b\in A$$ a,b∈A. It is shown that the class of l-hemi-implicative semilattices is a variety. These algebras provide (...) a general framework for the study of different algebras of interest in algebraic logic. In any l-hemi-implicative semilattice it is possible to define an derived operation by $$a \sim b := \wedge $$ a∼b:=∧. Endowing $$$$ with the binary operation $$\sim $$ ∼ the algebra $$$$ results an l-hemi-implicative semilattice, which also satisfies the identity $$a \sim b = b \sim a$$ a∼b=b∼a. In this article, we characterize the commutative l-hemi-implicative semilattices. We also provide many new examples of l-hemi-implicative semilattice on any semillatice with greatest element. Finally, we characterize congruences on the classes of l-hemi-implicative semilattices introduced earlier and we characterize the principal congruences of l-hemi-implicative semilattices. (shrink)

This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an important epistemological property with (...) canonical forms of self-consciousness such as introspection. (shrink)

It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool originally proposed by Evans (...) and subsequently refined by theorists in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s – most effectively, I think, by Christopher Peacocke (particularly in his 1992). Even worse, significant parts of the discussion are somewhat confused. This paper makes a start on clarifying what I think ought to be the central issues in debates about nonconceptual content. I begin in §1 by pointing out how narrowly focused contemporary discussion is relative to Evans’s original discussion. We are not making as much use as we should of nonconceptual content as a tool for understanding subpersonal information processing and the complexities of its status relative to perception and thought at the personal level. In §2 I turn to what is the central focus of contemporary discussion, namely, the content of perception and identify a “master argument” for nonconceptualism based on the relation between conceptual capacities and capacities for perceptual discrimination. The aim of §3 is to clarify the relation between the claim that perception has nonconceptual content and some superficially similar claims discussed by philosophers of perception. Finally, in §4 I explain why the attention recently focused on what is sometimes called the state version of the nonconceptualist thesis seems to me to be misdirected. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.

En décembre 2007, Jacqueline Hamesse a fêté son 65ème anniversaire, puis a accédé à l’éméritat en 2008. Nombreux sont les collègues et amis qui ont souhaité marquer ces dates en rendant hommage à son dévouement aux études médiévales, que ce soit dans l’enseignement et la recherche ou pour la création et le développement d’institutions internationales dans ce domaine, sans oublier les efforts déployés pour l’édition de nombreux ouvrages collectifs et l’organisation de diverses rencontres scientifiques. Nous avons donc décidé de lui (...) dédier ce volume d’études intitulé «Florilegium mediaevale». L’ouvrage comprend des études concernant l’un des quatre thèmes suivants: les textes philosophiques dans leur contexte et leur support matériel, les instruments travail ainsi que le vocabulaire des textes philosophiques. En effet, ce sont des domaines qui ont surtout retenu son attention depuis de nombreuses années et dans lesquels elle a apporté des contributions significatives à la recherche. Contributions de: L-J. Bataillon (†) et O. Weijers (Paris / Den Haag), F. Bertelloni (Buenos Aires), Ch. Burnett (London), J. Casteigt (Toulouse), J. Celeyrette et J-L. Solère (Lille / Boston), W. Courtenay (Wisconsin-Madison), G. Dahan (Paris), G. Dinkova-Bruun (Toronto), K. Emery Jr. (Notre Dame), Ch. Erismann (Cambridge), B. Faes de Mottoni (Milano), G. Federici Vescovini (Firenze), B. Fernández de la Cuesta (Madrid), R. Friedman et Ch. Schabel (Leuven / Nicosia), D. Gottschall (Lecce), S. Harvey (Jerusalem), I. Heullant-Donat (Reims), R. Hissette (Köln), M. Hoenen (Freiburg i.B.), J. Meirinhos (Porto), O. Merisalo (Jyväskylä), M. Mulchahey (Toronto), M. J. Muñoz Jiménez (Madrid), M. C. Pacheco (Porto), G. Piaia (Padova), R. H. Pich (Porto Alegre), J. Puig Montada (Madrid), R. Ramón Guerrero (Madrid), C. Sirat et M. Geoffroy (Paris), G. Spinosa (Roma), I. Ventura (Louvain-la-Neuve). (shrink)

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, framesprimeresponses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The (...) role of frames in reasoning can give rise torational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns ofquasi-cyclicalpreferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects. (shrink)

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of (...) moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership . She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation . De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion (...) to undercut my appeal to Anscombe. Section 1 of this article restates the case against the putative quale of ownership. Section 2 explains why de Vignemonts’ objections miss the mark. Section 3 discusses in more detail how to draw a principled distinction between bodily awareness and ordinary perceptual awareness. (shrink)

Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, and Agency by Thomas (...) Baldwin 7 At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism by James Russell 8 Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View by José Luis Bermúdez 9 Proprioception and the Body Image by Brian O’Shaughnessy 10 Awareness of One’s Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis by Marcel Kinsbourne 11 Body Schema and Intentionality by Shaun Gallagher 12 Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects by Jonathan Cole and Jacques Paillard 13 Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership by M. G. F. Martin 14 Bodily Awareness and the Self by Bill Brewer 15 Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription by Quassim Cassam 16 Consciousness and the Self by Naomi Eilan Contributors Index. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...) impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of folk psychology. (shrink)

In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with what has become close to philosophical orthodoxy – the view, most often associated with John Perry and David Lewis, that psychological explanations are essentially indexical. Cappelen and Dever claim that claims of essential indexicality are typically driven by intuitions rather than supported by arguments. They issue a challenge to supporters of essential indexicality: Produce an argument to back up the intuitions. This paper answers their challenge.

Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...) satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all. (shrink)